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Secure Mobile Payments Without Network Connectivity
ABSTRACT
Mobile payments depend on the availability of internet connectivity, e.g., to enable a
centralized service to authenticate a payment. This disclosure describes techniques to enable
peer-to-peer mobile payments in the absence of a network. A user has an initial amount, referred
to as the balance, that is transferred to their mobile device from a balance provider, e.g., a
financial institution. The balance is digitally signed by both the user and the balance provider. To
transact in the absence of a network, peer users perform a contactless payment as follows. The
receiver of funds verifies the availability of funds by examining the prior, authenticated,
transaction records of the sender. A transaction record including the transaction amount is
created and made immutable and secure using cryptographic techniques. When either the sender
or receiver regains network connectivity, the transaction is settled with the balance provider.
Double-spend attempts by a malicious sender are forestalled by enabling secure maintenance of
the true balance on a sender’s device (even in the absence of a network), and by enabling the
receiver to settle with the sender’s balance provider on the basis of an authenticated transaction
record.
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BACKGROUND
Digital payments depend on the availability of internet connectivity to enable a
centralized service to authenticate a payment. The network dependency prevents mobile
payments in the absence of the network, or even when there is a spike in network traffic. Even if
sufficient data center capacity is provided to handle spikes in traffic, the bandwidth and coverage
of the underlying mobile network remain a bottleneck. Also, the extra data center capacity,
which requires investment, remains underutilized during non-peak times. Network connectivity
remains a problem in many parts of the world. Even in relatively developed regions of the world,
network connectivity can be a problem in densely-populated areas such as transit stations,
shopping malls, tech parks, etc.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques to enable peer-to-peer mobile payments in the
absence of a network, and on devices that may not have fully secure operating environments.
When a mobile device of a user is connected to a network, the user requests an initial amount,
referred to as the balance, to be transferred to their mobile device from a balance provider, e.g., a
financial or other institution, using an acceptable financial instrument. With user permission, the
mobile device is remotely tested for integrity, e.g., the absence of malicious hardware or
software, by the balance provider using a mobile-device integrity verifier.
For example, the integrity of the device can be verified by having the device generating a
keypair, and using the keypair to have the device attest itself with a root certificate issued by a
trusted certificate authority. Upon successful remote verification of the integrity of the user
device, the user is issued a user-identity bundle by an identity issue service (IIS) and a balance
by the balance provider, digitally signed by both the user and the balance provider. For safety
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reasons, the balance can have an expiry date, e.g., a date after which it cannot be used without
reconfirmation by the balance provider.
The user-identity bundle enables peers to identify and authenticate each other during a
transaction. The user-identity bundle can include data such as user name, user public key,
receiver public key, identity expiry time, special permissions (if any), risk score, etc. The useridentity bundle is valid for a limited period of time; after its expiry, the credentials are refreshed
by re-connecting to the IIS. Upon reconnection, the state of the user device and their previous
transactions are validated before issuing a freshly-signed user-identity bundle, thus reducing the
risk of abuse.
In the absence of a network, peer users bring their mobile devices near each other (or
otherwise establish peer-to-peer communication between the devices) to effect a contactless
payment (e.g., over Bluetooth or NFC), without either device authenticating itself over a
network, as follows. The peer devices connect, authenticate each other, and set up a secure
communication channel using corresponding user identities, which are previously issued and
digitally signed by a trusted third party.
With appropriate permissions set up, the receiver device that is to receive funds verifies
the availability of sufficient balance at the sender to cover the transaction by examining the prior,
authenticated, transaction records of the sender, e.g., going back to the initial deposit made by
the balance provider. For the current transaction, a new transaction record including the present
transaction amount is created on both sender and receiver. The transaction record is signed with a
transaction-specific keypair generated by the secure key storage of the sender’s device and
attested to by the sender’s device (e.g. using a hardware-backed trusted execution environment
of the device); made immutable by being signed by the private keys of both parties to the
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transaction; and is appended to ledgers maintained at both sender and receiver device. When
either the sender or receiver regains network connectivity, the transaction is settled with the
balance provider. A sender can settle with all their counterparty receivers. A given receiver can
settle with not only a given sender but with all the receiver-counterparties of the given sender
who transacted with the given sender prior to the given receiver, without being privy to the other
receivers’ transactions with the sender. The ability of any single receiver in the pool of receivers
to settle other receivers’ transactions adds redundancy, e.g., even in an environment of generally
poor network connectivity, transactions can be rapidly settled.
The use of transaction-specific keypairs ensures that any attempt by the sender to alter or
delete a transaction from the ledger, e.g., to fraudulently claim a larger running balance or to
cheat a recipient of a previous transaction, results in further transactions being disabled. Because
the receiver also has a copy of the authenticated transaction record, attempts by the sender to
deny a transaction fail, as the receiver can always settle with the sender’s balance provider upon
the re-availability of a network connection. Double-spend attempts by the sender are forestalled
by enabling a receiver to authenticate the true and current balance on a sender’s device (even in
the absence of a network), and by enabling the receiver to settle with the sender’s balance
provider on the basis of an authenticated transaction record. Cloning of the balance on another
device is rendered ineffective by the user authentication and device integrity checks, and by
binding the balance to the device.
Aside from peer-to-peer mobile payments, the techniques of this disclosure can also be
used to enable unlocking of paid services such as transit gates, hotel rooms, self-driven, shared
vehicles, etc.
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With user permission, the techniques can leverage further features of mobile devices if
available, such as:
● A hardware-backed secure key storage implemented in a trusted execution environment.
Further, key material that resides on the hardware-backed secure key storage that cannot
be extracted by pure software methods.
● Biometric authentication.
● A secure key storage that ensures that an application can access its own keys but not
those of another application.
● A keypair attestation that provides a reliable indicator of genuineness of the secure key
storage, its capabilities, the state of the bootloader, and the integrity of the application. A
secure key storage that supports keypair attestation, which in turn provides a verifiable
chain of trust from the bootloader to the application.
● Security mechanisms that ensure that compromising a mobile payments app and/or
operating system (OS) at runtime is relatively non-trivial.
Key material that is non-extractable from the secure key storage via software methods
ensures that secret keys cannot be stolen or tampered with. The secure key storage also ensures
that the keys of one app/process cannot be used by another process in an uncompromised OS.
Hardware security modules or secure elements provide an added benefit that hardware attacks to
steal or tamper the secret keys are also non-trivial. Per the techniques, mobile devices that
include the above features can perform purely offline transactions, e.g., where both sender and
receiver are offline during the transaction.
Keypair attestation is a determining factor to establish trust between the two peers.
Keypair attestation on hardware-backed secure key storage reliably indicates whether: the device
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bootloader is unlocked; the boot state is not verified; and/or the application has been modified. If
the receiver finds that any of the above is true, the transaction with the sender can be declined or
proceed to enforce online authentication of the transaction.
If the mobile device is compromised, e.g., by a reboot of the device to unlock the
bootloader and subsequent installation of a rootkit, the previously issued balance gets destroyed.
The user is required to obtain a fresh balance again, triggering a mobile-device integrity
verification, which in turn indicates a compromised/unlocked device. The balance provider that
issued the original balance can then deny issuing new balance to the user.

Signature (key)

S

Private key (sk stands for secret key)

sk

Public key (pk stands for public key)

pk

The identity private key of a sender

sku

The identity private key of the 1st receiver

skr1

The public key of the nth transaction keypair

pkn

A balance-provider (or identity-provider) I’s private key

skI

Signature operating on data T using private key sk

Ssk(T)

Table 1: Notation

Table 1 illustrates the notation used in this disclosure. The balance can be signed by the
user and by the balance provider, which can be, e.g., on the RAM of a user device, and an
immutable ledger of transactions, which can be, e.g., on the filesystem of the device. The balance
provider issues a balance to the user, which remains immutable through its expiry. The issued
balance, its expiry date, the user’s public key, along with other data such as maximum allowed
transaction, transaction IDs, etc., constitute a balance bundle.
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The balance bundle, B, is signed by the balance provider (and identity provider) using its
private key, as indicated: SskI(B). The balance bundle is also signed by the private key of the
user. The signature of the balance provider can be verified by a party that wishes to transact with
the user, thereby verifying the authenticity of the issued balance. As explained before, the
balance bundle is issued after checking the integrity of the user’s device via a mobile-device
integrity verifier and by keypair attestation. This balance bundle is linked to an underlying form
of payment (FOP) that the user has linked with their payment-app account. Some example FOPs
are unified payment interface (UPI) mandate with multiple executions; prepaid wallet; postpaid
credit; etc.
An immutable ledger of transactions is maintained by the sender and by the receiver. A
transaction is made immutable by first signing the balance bundle with a per-transaction keypair
generated by an app of the sender on the secure key storage of their device. This signature is
called the transaction signature. When a balance is requested by the user, a zeroth keypair (sk0,
pk0) is generated, which is used by the balance-provider to authenticate the user.
The first transaction keypair is (sk1, pk1), the second transaction keypair is (sk2, pk2),
etc. The signing of the balance bundle with the first secret key is indicated by Ssk1(B+t1), where
t1 is the timestamp of the transaction. The sender cannot directly access a transaction keypair
because of the properties of the secure key storage. The sender cannot rollback to the previous
transaction because the app overwrites the previous transaction’s keypair when the current
transaction keypair is generated. The receiver can verify the transaction keypair via the secure
key storage attestation and transaction signature. Both sender (u) and first receiver (r1) then
confirm the transaction signature by signing with their respective private keys, e.g., via the
operations Ssku(T1) and Sskr1(T1) for the first transaction, where T1 is the transaction record,
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e.g., the data structure that includes the transaction amount. This makes the transaction entry in
the ledger immutable.
In a similar manner, the second transaction, in which the sender u sends an amount
encapsulated in transaction record T2 to a receiver r2 at a time t2 is signed by a transaction
signature sk2, denoted Ssk2(B+t2), signed by the sender’s signature Ssku(T1+T2), and signed by
the receiver’s signature Sskr2(T1+T2). For every signature made by a private key, the receiver
obtains the corresponding public key via the secure channel, such that the receiver can verify the
sender’s identity, balance in their account, the series of transactions conducted by the sender, etc.
Threat models
The described techniques can mitigate a variety of threats or attacks vectors, some of
which are listed in Table 2.
Attack vector

Mitigation

Sender unlocks the bootloader, roots the OS (a Assuming that the bootloader state is included
common way of rooting), and uses a rewith the keypair attestation (which is true on
packaged unsigned app.
devices with a secure hardware-backed key
storage), the receiver app will detect that the
bootloader is unlocked and deny the
transaction.
Sender attempts to repackage the app on an
uncompromised OS.

An incorrect application signature will be
reported to the secure key storage by the
uncompromised OS; this can be detected by
the receiver app.

Sender colludes with multiple receivers. Both
sender and receiver run a re-packaged binary.
The sender rolls back transactions and carries
out multiple spends with the same balance
bundle while the receivers skip the
verification step. Then the receiver goes
online to settle their transactions.

Since the balance provider has information on
the balance amount issued to the sender it can
reliably detect that the transaction amount
received from that sender is higher than the
balance issued.
Also, when the receiver goes online to claim
their money, the attestation from their secure
key storage would be verified at the server, and
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Attack vector

Mitigation
the unlocked-bootloader or incorrect app
signature would be detected. The transaction
can be flagged to be manually verified.

Malware installed on the sender’s phone gets This threat is mitigated in a manner similar to
access to keys generated by a payment
the one where the payment application itself is
application on the hardware-backed secure key re-packaged.
storage.
Phishing attack by a man-in-the-middle
pretending to be the receiver.

The underlying cryptographic technique to
establish the secure channel between the two
parties prevents man-in-the-middle attacks.
Additionally, verified identities for merchants
with pictures are displayed on the phone of the
user (sender of money).

User’s phone gets lost/stolen and gets into the
hands of a malicious person

Making the transaction keys require biometric
authentication will prevent the malicious
person from performing transactions to some
extent. An additional PIN entry within the
payment app can prevent unauthorized
transactions. Thus the stolen phone cannot be
easily used for offline transactions.

Table 2: Various threats and their mitigations

CONCLUSION
Mobile payments depend on the availability of a mobile network, e.g., to enable a
centralized service to authenticate a payment. This disclosure describes techniques to enable
peer-to-peer mobile payments in the absence of a network. A user has an initial amount, referred
to as the balance, that is transferred to their mobile device from a balance provider, e.g., a
financial institution. The balance is digitally signed by both the user and the balance provider. To
transact in the absence of a network, peer users perform a contactless payment as follows. The
receiver of funds verifies the availability of funds by examining the prior, authenticated,
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transaction records of the sender. A transaction record including the transaction amount is
created and made immutable by being signed by both parties to the transaction. It is additionally
signed with a transaction-specific keypair generated by and attested to by the sender’s device,
and is appended to ledgers maintained at both sender and receiver. When either the sender or
receiver regains network connectivity, the transaction is settled with the balance provider.
Double-spend attempts by the sender are forestalled by enabling verification of the true balance
on a sender’s device (even in the absence of a network), and by enabling the receiver to settle
with the sender’s balance provider on the basis of an authenticated transaction record.
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